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The monetarist counterrevolution and the stagflation period of the 1970s were among 
the theoretical and practical developments that led to the rejection of fiscal policy as a 
useful tool for macroeconomic stabilization and full employment determination.  Recent 
mainstream contributions, however, have begun to reassess fiscal policy and have called 
for its restitution in certain cases. The goal of this paper is to delimit the role of and place 
for fiscal policy in the New Economic Consensus (NEC) and to compare it to that of 
Post-Keynesian theory, the latter arguably the most faithful approach to the original 
Keynesian message. The paper proposes that, while a consensus may exist on many 
macroeconomic issues within the mainstream, fiscal policy is not one of them. The 
designation of fiscal policy within the NEC is explored and contrasted with the Post-
Keynesian calls for fiscal policy via Abba Lerner’s “functional finance” approach. The 
paper distinguishes between two approaches to functional finance—one that aims to 
boost aggregate demand and close the GDP gap, and one that secures full employment 
via direct job creation. It is argued that the mainstream has severed the Keynesian link 
between fiscal policy and full employment—a link that the Post-Keynesian approach 
promises to restore. 
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  2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It took no more than four decades after the publication of the General Theory, which 
offered a revolutionary view of employment and output determination and motivated the 
need for fiscal policy to secure and maintain full employment, for the virtual 
abandonment of fiscal policy by mainstream economists. Post Keynesians, by contrast, 
have been among the few faithful advocates of the original Keynesian contributions and 
have continually called for reinstating fiscal policy as a main tool for macroeconomic 
coordination, with full employment as its overriding objective. In recent years, however, 
the orthodox camp too has renewed its interest in fiscal policy (e.g. Allsopp and Vines 
2005; Bernanke 2002 and 2003b; Blinder 2004; Krugman 2005; Solow 2005; Wren-
Lewis 2000). What is this new role and how does it fit within mainstream theory? Does 
this new role make it possible to reinstate the original link between fiscal policy and full 
employment? How do the mainstream contributions compare to those from the Post-
Keynesian school?  
Some have argued that the macroeconomic debates of the mid to late 1990s have 
subsided, and that mainstream economics has entered an era of New Neoclassical 
synthesis also known as the New Economic Consensus (NEC) (Snowdon and Vane 2005; 
Goodfriend 2004). The position taken here is that, while many issues may have been 
resolved, the role of fiscal policy is not one of them. The purpose of this paper is to 
clarify the potential opening for fiscal policy effectiveness within the New Economic 
Consensus and review the main debates surrounding this issue. It also compares the NEC 
designation for fiscal policy with that of Post-Keynesian theory.  
Recently, post Keynesians have advocated restitution of fiscal policy via Abba 
Lerner’s functional finance approach (e.g. Arestis and Sawyer 2003; Bell 1999; Forstater 
1999). I argue that there are two distinct approaches to functional finance and offer a 
synopsis of each. One is an approach that aims to increase aggregate demand and close 
the GDP gap; the other aims to secure full employment through direct job creation.  The 
paper compares these two approaches with fiscal policy in the NEC.  
 
  31.  FISCAL POLICY IN THE NEW ECONOMIC CONSENSUS: THEORY 
 
The New Consensus is an amalgamation of the developments in macroeconomics from 
the Neoclassical Synthesis to the present day.  It is an approach whose defining 
characteristic is the claim that choice-theoretic micro-foundations determine 
macroeconomic outcomes.  It is now settled in the mainstream that to explain aggregate 
employment and output results, all macroeconomic models must adequately incorporate 
individual intertemporal decision-making based on rational expectations. In this 
framework, deviations from natural output equilibrium are possible (unlike in the New 
Classical and Real Business Cycle theory), but they are due to the behavior of rational 
individuals within the confines of a myriad of rigidities in the labor and capital markets.  
Natural output is no longer the same thing as Keynes’s full employment output 
equilibrium; rather it is the level of output that would occur under perfectly flexible 
prices and wages (Leith and Wren-Lewis 2005). In the short run, it is also the level of 
unemployment that does not accelerate inflation.
1  Therefore, the inflation-
unemployment tradeoff encapsulated in the expectations-augmented Phillips curve is 
another hallmark of the NEC, where unemployment is usually captured in the NEC 
models by the output gap.  Finally, if individual constrained optimization takes place i
imperfect or incomplete markets, there is an important role for short-term corrective 
policy.  The shape and form of these remedial measures is another major feature of the 






ry policy.  
Perhaps the most significant consensus has occurred around the role and functions
of monetary policy.  In contrast to the monetarist counterrevolution, the New Consensus 
now holds that Central Banks cannot exogenously alter the stock of money. Instead, th
can only set exogenously the short-term interest rate, leaving the money supply to be 
determined endogenously by the credit needs of the economy. In the NEC, Friedman’s 
                                                 
1 Paradoxically also referred to as the “full employment rate of unemployment.”  





 fact, because the latter 
specifie
yment.  
The above are considered to be the core propositions of the NEC, abridged in the 
el (after Woodford 2003): 
 
(i)  he IS equation:  
e composite exogenous disturbance gt and a 
iven real interest rate (it is the nominal target and Etπt+1 are current expectations of 
                 
rist view that Central Banks control monetary aggregates
2 has been replac
the Real Business Cycle claim that money is endogenous.
3 
The monetarist idea that the Central Bank is nonetheless responsible for 
controlling inflation remains a central tenet, but now the main tool for inflation control 
the interest rate, not the money supply. This notion, coupled with the old ISLM idea tha
changes in interest rates affect investment and output, have produced a consensus that 
monetary policy can affect both output and inflation through adjustments in the rate of
interest.  The combination of the interest-investment relationship and the interest rate 
control mechanism in the NEC indicates that monetary policy can perform aggregate 
demand management functions, should output deviate from its natural level.  Because 
discretionary changes are discouraged due to policy time inconsistency considerations 
(Sargent and Wallace 1973), the type of monetary policy that is advocated by NEC is on
based on a reaction function a la Taylor rule (see Taylor 1993). In
s both an output gap and an inflationary gap, it is believed to be the best policy 
tool to tackle the dual challenge of inflation and unemplo
following three-equation mod
T
yt = gt + Et (yt+1 – gt+1) – σ (it – Etπt+1)       (1) 
 
where current output yt is a function of som
g
future inflation rates).  
                                
2 Even Milton Friedman has recanted the notion that the money supply is exogenous (Friedman 2003). 
3 There is a crucial distinction between the endogenous approach to money in the NEC and that in the Post-
Keynesian approach. In the former, money is only endogenous, because the velocity of money is somehow 
unstable. But money in and of itself is still neutral with respect to production and output and only affects 
nominal values. In other words, money is what greases the economic wheel by eliminating transaction 
costs and by giving us nominal equivalences. In the post-Keynesian approach, money is never neutral. In a 
monetary production economy, money is a real input of production and is the vehicle that sets the economic 
wheels in motion. Money contracts are essential in reducing the fundamental uncertainty economic agents 
face and any setback to expectations has a real effect on money contracts and thereby on output (Davidson 
2002).  
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(ii)  The New Keynesian Phillips curve: 
πt = k (yt – ypt) + β Etπt + 1        (2) 
here the rate of inflation πt is a function of the output gap (or the difference between 







however, we observe a modern day liquidity trap a la Japan. In Japan monetary policy 
                                                
w
real and potential output yt – 
ctations-augmented Phillips curve. 
 
(iii)  The Taylor rule:  
it = in + φπ (πt -πt*) + φy (yt – ypt)       (3) 
 
he current operating target (the funds rate it), adjusts to an implicit desired funds 
rate (which is the Wicksellian “natural” rate of interest in) and to changes in output and 
inflation rates from their targets. 
To be effective, short-term demand management via monetary policy must be 1) 
automatic, 2) transparent and 3) credible.
4  So what is the designated place and role for 
fiscal policy in this approach?  
Recent calls for the restitution of fiscal policy in the NEC generally emerge from 
concerns with the zero-interest rate bound to monetary policy (e.g. Bernanke, Reinhart 
and Sack 2004; Krugman 2005). Since the short-term rate is the main policy lever unde
Central Bank control, once it reaches zero, no further economic stimulus from monetary 
policy is possible. It is in this context that fiscal policy is being called to the rescue. This
is effectively a reformulation of the old liquidity trap problem. The ISLM Keynesians 
argued that when an increase in the exogenous money stock produced no fall in the rate 
of interest, monetary policy was ineffective as all new money/cash balances were be
absorbed, instead of being directed toward new investment. In the NEC the short-term 
rate is the exogenous variable under Central Bank control, and as long as it keeps fallin
some increase in investment will occur. When it reaches its nominal bound of zero, 
 
4 Many have argued that monetary policy independence is also a major prerequisite for monetary policy 
effectiveness but, as I argue later in this section, new development in the New Consensus on the 
interactions between fiscal and monetary may necessitate abandoning policy independence as an objective. 
  6was considered to be largely ineffective while zero interest rates prevailed for 5
without a noticeable recovery in
 years 
















ment spending, triggering renewed interest in fiscal policy as a tool for 
macroeconomic stabilization.  
In the NEC literature, however, the dominant view is still that fiscal po
distortionary, inflationary and therefore useful mostly in extreme deflationary period
(see for example Krugman 2005). Blinder also opposes the “the case against 
discretionary fiscal policy,” but he explicitly does not advocate the “case for” fiscal 
policy.  In fact, in normal times, Blinder supports “the now-standard view that the centr
bank should and does have a dominant role in stabilization policy” (2004, p. 2, original 
emphasis). Bernanke has also argued that, in the short run, fiscal authorities may ha
important reasons to deviate from a balanced budget stance, especially when faced with 
national emergencies or deep recessions. In the lo
s confidence, fiscal discipline must be exercised and the national debt must remain
at stable and moderate levels (Bernanke 2003a).  
What has changed in the Neoclassical Consensus is that fiscal policy is no lo
considered ineffective as it was once viewed by the New Classical and Real Business 
Cycle theories. Instead, its distortionary and inflationary effects can be exploited in 
difficult times to complement stabilization via monetary policy.  This new role for fisc
policy must be studied in the context of endogenous money. Furthermore, it must be 
recognized that if fiscal policy affects output and inflation, then it necessarily affects 
monetary policy as well. Similarly, an inflation targeting monetary policy can influence
those fiscal effects (Woodford 1998). For these reasons, far from being independent f
each othe
 must be closely coordinated (Bernanke 2002; Woodford 1998; Wren-Lewis 
2000).   
The impact of fiscal policy on demand within the NEC is based on wealth effects
from deficit spending that were previously rejected by the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis. There have been many challenges to the latter, but the most influential (and 
still controversial) one comes from Woodford’s 1995 Fiscal Theory of the Price Level 
(FTPL). Although, as the name suggests, this is a theory of price determination, it is th
  7approach that gives us the renewed role for fiscal policy effectiveness. To understand this 
new role, it is important to examine the following issues: 1) the effect of governm




ing government spending and whether or not there is a binding budget 
onstraint, and 3) the impact of fiscal policy on the banking system and Central Bank 
) 
 only role for fiscal policy under this scenario 











1.1 Ricardian Equivalence and the Effect of Government Spending and Debt on 
Rational Individuals.  
As already noted, subscription to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis as in Barro (1974
invalidated fiscal policy effectiveness. The
 it affects margins or incentives (Sargent 1986). The supply side effects of fiscal
policy are readily embraced by the NEC. 
Ricardian equivalence has been challenged on several grounds. First, it is q
possible that individuals may face liquidity constraints which prevent them from 
maintaining constant patterns of spending. Under Ricardian equivalence, if taxes 
increase, individuals are not expected to adjust their spending downward, because they 
know that a tax cut is coming, that will offset these temporary changes to incomes. But if 
individuals face borrowing/liquidity constraints (due to imperfect or incomplete fina
markets, for example) they will reduce their demand and fiscal policy will have an effect. 
In a similar vein, Campbell and Mankiw (1990) have argued that this consumption 
ing effect is not empirically supported. This is not because the permanent incom
hypothesis is false, but because there are rigidities, which prevent the proper adjustme
Another challenge to Ricardian equivalence critiques Barro’s assumption of an 
infinite household lifespan. Individuals are mortal and if they believe that the current 
budget deficit will be offset far into the future (meaning that future generations will
for today’s deficit), they may in fact feel better off and increase their expenditures
2000).  Solow (2005), for example, has recently observed that during the Japanese 
recession government deficit spending was not saved, as suggested by Ricardian 
equivalen
  8Japanes  
d, 
 case 
e norm. Under those 
gimes fiscal policy is effective. Woodford argues that according to Ricardian 
where B  
s 








individuals (the bondholders) as a permanent windfall to their wealth, realizing that no 
e economy. Households, it seems, adjust their spending due to a windfall from
deficits.  
The final and more important challenge to the Ricardian view of fiscal policy 
comes from the above-mentioned Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) (Woodfor
1998). In this theory, Woodford claims that Ricardian equivalence is one special
among many. In fact non-Ricardian fiscal policy regimes are th
re
equivalence the following condition must always be satisfied. 
 
Bt/Pt = Present value of primary fiscal surpluses as of time t, t = 0, 1, … (4)  
 
t is the nominal value of government liabilities at the beginning of period t and Pt
is the price level (see Bassetto, forthcoming). 
This relationship states that the real value of government debt today must alway
equal the net present value of future surpluses. In a sens
e” real government debt. So today’s deficits (which increase government debt) 
must necessarily be offset by future primary surpluses. 
But there may be fiscal regimes that do not behave in this way. In other words,
there may be no commitment by the fiscal authority to increase future taxes in order to 
offset the current rise in nominal government liabilities and balance the above budget 
constraint. In such cases, prices must necessarily adjust. The instances when governm
promise no future offsets to today’s spending are called non-Ricardian fiscal regimes 
(this is Woodford’s terminology, but these regimes are also quite similar to Leeper’s 
(1991) “passive” monetary and “active” fiscal policy reg
cal policies will have sizeable demand-side effects on both inflation and output 
and they are manifested via a wealth effect mechanism. 
Suppose that we are in a non-Ricardian fiscal regime, where the government h
made no commitment to abide by the above intertemporal budget constraint.  Suppos
also that a sudden increase in government spending is financed, as Woodford (1995) 
argues, by issuing bonds. The new injection of bonds will be interpreted by rational 
  9future tax increases will offset today’s government spending. From this wealth effect, 




p. 489): government bond 





ew voices like Woodford’s (see also 





insofar as prices rise” (Woodford 2000, p. 19). 
The resulting boon to demand is only temporary, however, as the accompanying 
price increase will eventually erode the real value of the new financial assets. This in
will induce households to either cut demand or increase supply. A new equilibrium 
condition is established. Debt has risen, spending has increased and so have prices to
balance the intertemporal budget constraint above.  This is the bond drop theory of 
inflation (Woodford 1995, p. 22n24; Allsopp and Vines 2005, 
fi
 
1.2 Government Finance and Budget Constraints  
Some economists have questioned the implications of non-Ricardian fiscal regimes u
the FTPL. Just because there are such regimes, they argue, is it not still the case that 
government bonds would need to be repaid sooner or later? Doesn’t the government fac
a budget constraint after all? If governments keep issuing nominal liabilities, wouldn’
this lead to an unsustainable explosion in the government debt?  The answer to all of 
these questions by Woodford is “no,” but before we explain why, we need to discuss the 
traditional view of government finance and budget constraints—a view that is prevale
in the New Economic Consensus, save for the f
B
 
1.2.1  The Traditional vs. the New Consensus View of Government Finance  
The traditional view of government finance is well known. Governments are generally 
considered to be no different than individuals and firms, whose optimizing behav
subject to budget constraints. Because of the distortionary supply side effects of 
government spending, it is commonly believed that “good housekeeping” in the 
“sound finance” must be generally practiced (Allsopp and Vines 2005, p. 486). 
Governments must abide by their intertermporal budget constraints and offset today’s 
spending by current or future taxes. Ideally, these offsets should not occur too far into th
future, in order to guarantee intergenerational equity (i.e., future generations should 
  10finance present generations’ well-being).  Furthermore, large deviations from these 
constraints are believed to undermine the sustainability of the government budget. 
Sustainability, therefore, is a major common concern for mainstream economists, but 
there is a growing disagreement about what exactly it means.  In most analyses, it mea
that the government will simply be unable to borrow from the private sector, making 
deficit spending unsustainable. But others have argued that sustainability should mean 
solvency, since 
ns 
the government, unlike the private sector, could always borrow from its 
Central
on 






, a main goal for policy is to 
void an intolerable tax burden on future generations:   
 
temporal equity rather 
than short-run stabilization. (Wren-Lewis 2000, p. 92) 
 
 Bank.  
Allsopp and Vines summarize the main two criteria for sustainability—one 
concerns the solvency of the state and the other refers to “tight and binding constraints to 
budget deficits and debt, intending to limit the freedom of the fiscal authorities” (2005, p. 
486). The two authors argue in favor of the former definition, as in reality the interacti
between the monetary and fiscal authority under an interest rate peg, permits sizeable 
fluctuations in the debt stock – a position that originates in Woodford’s FTPL (see also 
Woodford
.  
Solvency for Allsop and Vines is not in question (2005). According to this criteria 
then, one could argue that government spending is forever sustainable. The implication 
this definition is that one need not worry about budget sustainability, but about the re
effects of deficit spending on the economy.  This is reminiscent of the calls by early 
Keynesians such as Abba Lerner for functional finance, arguing that government policy
should not be judged by the size of the deficit but by the impact it has on the economy 
(Lerner 1943). However, this is hardly a proposition embraced by the New Economic 
Consensus.  In fact, the “sound finance” perspective dominates, suggesting that debt-to
GDP caps are necessary in order to avoid the distortionary and inflationary effects of 
government spending. Furthermore, as mentioned above
a
When it comes to the aggregate stance of fiscal policy, the focus of interest for 
government today is in issues of sustainability and inter
  11For these reasons, as Allsopp and Vines argue, the general assignment of fiscal 
policy in the NEC is the “control and sustainability of the public finances as well as on 
the resource allocation and distributional effects of budgetary policy” (2005, p. 486). 
Both Wren-Lewis (2000) and Allsopp and Vines (2005) reject this assignment of 
fiscal policy and instead advocate its important demand side effects. Leith and Wren-
Lewis also observe that traditional concerns with budget constraints suggest that, if 
governments should play any stabilization role at all, it should generally be confined to 
stabilizing the debt stock through fiscal instruments (2005, p. 592). In this context, 
discretionary fiscal policy is particularly problematic as compared to automatic 
stabilizers, because it is more likely to lead to ever increasing deficits and debts. 
Furthermore, discretionary and temporary changes to government spending are believed 
to cause higher than normal deficits as suggested by the tax smoothing literature 
(Henning 2005, p. 28). The intertemporal budget constraint is an important underlying 
condition for understanding the role of fiscal policy in mainstream theory. 
These are some of the deeply entrenched mainstream views on government 
finance, save for a handful of dissenting voices like Woodford’s. How does he answer the 
above three questions (reproduced again here): 1) Isn’t it the case that government bonds 
need to be repaid sooner or later? 2) Doesn’t the government face a budget constraint 
after all? and 3) If governments keep issuing nominal liabilities, wouldn’t they cause an 
unsustainable explosion in the government debt?   
The answer to the first question is that the government can always issue more 
liabilities and roll over its debt indefinitely. As an example, Woodford suggests that “it is 
possible for a government to finance transfers to an initial old generation by issuing debt 
that it then ‘rolls over’ forever, without ever raising taxes” (2000, p. 30)
 5. But what if the 
private sector simply refuses to buy these government liabilities. Isn’t this the effective 
budget constraint? 
It is easy to interpret the rejection of the public to buy government debt as a 
refusal to finance deficit spending. This could lead one to believe that the public’s 
preference for other assets would be a barrier to government financing. But such an 
                                                 
5 One could interpret his argument to support the view that Social Security faces no funding constraints, 
ever. 
  12interpretation, Woodford argues, would be a mistake. There are two ways to circumvent 
this problem. First, if the government makes it clear that this is a permanent increase in 
nominal debt, people will buy it because it represents an increase in net wealth.  
Secondly, Woodford does not think that it is reasonable to assume that people will ever 
refuse to buy government bonds (if the government wants to sell bonds someone will buy 
them), but if they do, the Central Bank will step in. 
In an interest rate peg regime (which Woodford calls “bond price-support 
regime”), it is the responsibility of the Central Bank to maintain the price of the short-
term bond, i.e., the interest rate (2000, p. 8). Should the government decide to 
exogenously increase spending by debt finance, the Central Bank will serve as the 
residual buyer of bonds. Thus, even though households end up holding government 
bonds, it is still not the case that the private sector imposes limits on government 
spending. For Woodford, the proper interpretation of government debt owned by the 
public is the following: 
 
…[it] is a consequence of optimal wealth accumulation by households, not of any 
constraint upon government borrowing programs other than the  requirement that 
in equilibrium someone has to choose to hold the debt that the government 
issues.” (Woodford 2000, p. 30, original emphasis) 
 
In other words, the private sector’s liquidity preference determines the amount of 
debt held by the public in equilibrium. Finally, the answer to the third question is that an 
explosion of debt is possible but not necessarily technically unsustainable (as we shall see 
later, there is a greater danger that an overly tight monetary policy stance would cause 
such an explosion). Although Woodford does not belabor this point, he is in fact arguing 
that there are no technical constraints to government spending, as is traditionally 
believed. The government is a very different agent from the private sector. Woodford 
summarizes these points:  
 
A subtler question is whether it makes sense to suppose that actual market 
institutions do not actually impose a constraint of this kind upon governments 
(whether logically necessary or not), given that we believe that they impose such 
borrowing limits upon households and firms. The best answer to this question, I 
believe, is to note that a government that issues debt denominated in its own 
  13currency is in a different situation than from that of private borrowers, in that its 
debt is a promise only to deliver more of its own liabilities. (A Treasury bond is 
simply a promise to pay dollars at various future dates, but these dollars are 
simply additional government liabilities, that happen to be non-interest-earning.) 
There is thus no possible doubt about the government’s technical ability to deliver 
what it has promised; this is not an implausible reason for financial markets to 
treat government debt issues in a different way than the issuance of private debt 
obligations. (Woodford 2000, p. 32, original emphasis) 
 
The unique nature of government liabilities is being recognized by the New 
Consensus, in support of the view that fiscal policy does not face traditional budget 
constraints. Allsopp and Vines also adopt the Woodford position to argue that, when 
exploring the stabilizing potential of fiscal policy, it is much more useful to talk about 
solvency than sustainability subject to some tight and binding constraints.  Now that we 
have examined government finance, let us revisit the FTPL transmission mechanism of 
government spending and its wealth effect. 
 
1.2.2  The Wealth Effect and the Bond Drop 
Woodford’s bond drop creates a wealth effect when these bonds are sold to private 
agents. In his initial statement of the FTPL (in Woodford 1995), he literally assumes a 
“helicopter bond drop” (much like Friedman’s helicopter drop of money). But in a 
modern economy, how such a bond drop is financed needs to be explained.  This is 
important because the wealth effect occurs only when the total private holdings of net 
government liabilities have increased.  In other words “the relevant measure of nominal 
government liabilities for [the] discussion of the ‘wealth effect’ is the sum of government 
debt in the hands of the public and the monetary base” (private correspondence, April 7 
2008, original emphasis).  This would mean that if private agents use reserves to buy 
bonds, there would be no wealth effect, since they would be exchanging one government 
liability for another. Note that using “near monies,” such as private checking accounts to 
buy government bonds will not do the job, because clearing such payments with the Fed 
in fact destroys an equivalent amount of reserves.   
There are many reasons why in flexible exchange rate systems with government 
provided money, to view the private sector as “financing” government spending by 
purchasing its debt makes no sense. The main reason is that in sovereign currency 
  14nations, governments always spend by electronically crediting bank accounts, i.e. by 
creating reserves (see Wray 2003). Once these reserves have been created, the private 
sector could choose to purchase government bonds, but this would hardly constitute 
financing government spending via a bond drop.  Rather government spending is 
financed by a “reserve drop” first, i.e., by creating new reserves which could later be used 
to buy bonds. Woodford does not acknowledge this fact, even as he recognizes that a 
bond drop, which occurs from Federal Reserve Open Market Operations (OMOs), does 
not create net new government liabilities, and therefore produces no wealth effect 
(private correspondence, April 7, 2008). While he does not provide an explicit statement 
of how private purchases of bonds are financed, he does state that if the private sector 
refuses to buy government bonds, the Fed will do the job as a residual buyer (thereby 
removing any private sector financing constraint on the government).  In his analysis the 
bond drop aims to explain how an increase in total government liabilities in the hands of 
the public can produce a wealth effect that will induce changes in prices. When the 
private sector increases its holdings of net nominal government liabilities, and the amount 
of which is greater than the present value of exogenously determined future surpluses, the 
private sector will understand that taxes will not be raised to offset the bond drop. 
Expecting greater overall lifetime consumption, households increase their spending, push 
prices up, and thus erode the value of these government liabilities, until the budget 
constraint in (4) above is in equilibrium. In fact for Woodford, the condition in (4) is just 
that—it is an equilibrium condition, not an actual constraint on the government imposed 
on it by private agents.  
 
1.2.3  The Wealth Effect and Inflation 
These results are radically different from most mainstream analyses. First, inflation is not 
a monetary phenomenon. In fact, the implication of Woodford’s approach is that inflation 
is purely a fiscal phenomenon. This is the source of much controversy in the mainstream 
with regard to the effects of fiscal policy, as it suggests that the quantity theory of money 
is irrelevant. Money is endogenously determined, velocity is unstable, and now prices are 
determined by the relationship of government deficit spending relative to the real value of 
future primary surpluses.  This also means that there may be many different price levels 
  15that will be consistent with the quantity equation relationship, and they will all depend on 
the level of nominal debt issued by the government. A bond drop via OMOs conducted 
by the monetary authority is not inflationary. Neither is a bond purchase (which is the 
same thing as the monetarist helicopter drop of money), since the total level of nominal 
government liabilities remains unchanged. A money drop, however, from a money-
financed government spending (often called by the mainstream the monetization of debt), 
creates a wealth effect and is believed to be inflationary.  Note also, that it was previously 
believed that the monetization of debt was forced on the Central Bank by the fiscal 
authority, in order to allow the government to extract seigniorage revenue. This is not a 
core proposition of the NEC. In fact, it is generally agreed that seigniorage is so small, as 
to be irrelevant to the understanding of the monetization of debt (e.g. Sims 1994; 
Woodford 2000).  The FTPL turns neoclassical monetarist propositions on their head and 
opens up the door for a more realistic view of government finance in a world of 
endogenous money. As I have already suggested and will argue later, this view still 
suffers from some serious limitations, but it nonetheless adds a layer of realism absent 
from mainstream theory up to now. What is paradoxical, however, is that the inflationary 
impact of government spending has served to reinforce belief in the need to impose 
budget constraints, even if they do not naturally exist to the detriment of useful 
stabilization or full employment policies. Sound finance remains unchallenged.  
 
1.3 The Impact of Fiscal Policy on the Banking System and on Central Bank Policy 
The final issue to consider is the interaction between the monetary and fiscal authorities 
under this “passive monetary active fiscal regime” (Leeper 1991). Allsop and Vines 
argue that fiscal policy ineffectiveness within the NEC carries a very specific meaning. 
There is a possibility, the authors suggest, that “the behavior of the fiscal authorities will 
be taken into account by the monetary authorities, leaving the overall macroeconomic 
behavior of the system little changed” (2005, p. 494). In other words, the central bank can 
“internalize” fiscal behavior.  Monetary policy still sits at the steering wheel and only 
“allows” fiscal policy to be effective. 
  16One could argue that an inflation-fighting Central Bank could increase interest 
rates in order to offset the inflationary impact of government.  But the ability of the 
monetary authority to neutralize the fiscal inflationary effect is also debated.  
Remember the budget constraint from above:  
 
Bt/Pt = Present value of primary fiscal surpluses as of time t, t = 0, 1, … (4)  
 
If the Central Bank fights inflation, and prices do not adjust upward to eliminate 
the wealth effect and equilibrate the intertemporal budget constraint above, real 
government debt will forever be larger than the net present value of the primary surplus. 
This may lead to a situation where demand is forever greater than supply (because 
rational agents know that this disequilibrium will persist due to the inflation-targeting 
monetary stance) and the wealth effect could turn out to be so large as to be 
hyperinflationary. Woodford makes a similar argument, suggesting that a reaction 
function like the one proposed by Taylor 1993 may actually accelerate the inflationary 
effect of government spending (Woodford 1998). A fiscal policy disturbance may 
become more serious in an inflation-fighting monetary policy regime, than in the 
traditional ISLM framework, where the shift in the IS curve can be neutralized by MP 
(ibid., p. 21). 
Taylor has proposed an aggressive monetary rule (Christiano and Fitzgerald 
2000), but if the initial value of nominal public debt is very large, such a policy 
Woodford argues will backfire. As Christiano and Fitzgerald explain, a higher nominal 
interest rate intended to fight the inflationary effects of high government debt, would lead 
to a more rapid increase in the nominal debt. Since the expected future primary surplus 
does not change, prices must adjust, leading to an increase in inflation. An inflation 
targeting monetary authority, which uses a more aggressive Taylor rule, will 
automatically increase the nominal interest rate, further exasperating nominal debt and 
therefore inflation. An inflationary spiral results (ibid., p. 32). This according to Loyo  
  17(1999) was the case in Brazil during the 1990s, which he describes as the “tight monetary 
paradox”
6,7. 
The foregoing analysis seems to undermine the traditional view of Central Bank 
independence. Woodford for example says that he supports the definition of 
independence in the sense of pursuing “autonomous monetary policy, …a rule for setting 
its instrument (in practice, a nominal interest rate) that is independent of fiscal variables” 
(2000, p. 4, original emphasis). But he makes it clear that, if this nominal rate rule is too 
aggressive, it may turn out to be destabilizing and inflationary, if the fiscal stance is 
consistent with large nominal debt (he therefore suggests alternative rules to circumvent 
this problem). It is unclear how fiscal policy can be separated from monetary policy. Both 
have an impact on output and inflation according to this interpretation. We have entered a 
new age of policy effectiveness, where the optimal policy mix is in dispute. Some have 
argued that it is fiscal policy that is responsible for this policy mix and that once it has 
been established, it could have significant stabilizing effects (Allsopp and Vines 2005).  
Although NEC authors have called for the coordination between monetary and 
fiscal policy, it is still the choice-theoretic assumptions that drive the analysis of the 
effects of monetary or fiscal policy. If fiscal policy is clearly articulated to the public as 
Ricardian (i.e., deficits are always exactly offset by surpluses), fiscal policy will be 
ineffective; but if it is non-Ricardian, then fiscal policy, monetary policy, and their 
interaction must be clear and transparent to the public, so that rational agents can make 
optimal decisions.  
Because there is a widespread agreement that fiscal policy is inherently 
inflationary, it is believed to be useful mainly in deflationary conditions. In normal times, 
monetary policy must dominate and fiscal policy should remain passive, with its only aim 
                                                 
6 Others have argued that we can eliminate the inflationary effect of government by imposing spending 
constraints, debt-to-GDP limits (e.g. Maastricht criteria in the EU), but Woodford shows that spending 
bounds do not change his conclusions. In fact imposing a ceiling on government spending could make self-
fulfilling deflation possible (Woodford 1998, p. 3). Thus monetary and fiscal policy must be very carefully 
coordinated. 
7 This happens not because the Fed monetizes the government’s debt. In fact for Woodford the 
monetization analogy is not useful. The only thing that matters is that large deficit spending may create 
expectations of even bigger future deficits, which through their excessive wealth effect produce 
hyperinflation (1998). 
  18to anchor expectations adequately. If fiscal policy is needed, it needs to be automatic, 
transparent, and credible and must abide by rules.  
 
2.  FISCAL POLICY IN THE NEW ECONOMIC CONSENSUS: POLICY 
 
The application of the New Consensus view to policy is perhaps best illustrated by the 
writings and policy actions of new Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke.  Bernanke 
embraces the core concepts of the NEC (the IS curve, the Phillips curve, and the Taylor 
rule) and unlike his predecessor Greenspan, avidly supports inflation-targeting policies 
(2003a). He believes Taylor rules to be very effective in meeting the dual challenge of 
inflation and unemployment (Seidman 2006, p. 20)
8.  
Also unlike Greenspan, he has advocated the need for fiscal policy as a 
stabilization tool in times of crises.
9 To be effective, however, fiscal policy must be 
closely coordinated with monetary policy. This coordination, as mentioned above, puts 
into question traditional Central Bank independence.  For Bernanke, the role of a Central 
Bank is different in inflationary and deflationary environments. In the latter, there may 
need to be a “more cooperative stance on the part of the Central Bank” (Bernanke 
2003b). He suggests that fiscal policy may need to take the reigns during severe 
downturns and monetary policy must facilitate it. Unlike monetarists, he is suggesting 
that fiscal policy should be allowed to dominate. How might this be accomplished and 
what type of coordination does Bernanke suggest? 
For Bernanke, as for other NEC economists, fiscal policy has an important role to 
play in a Japanese-style deflationary drag, when monetary policy reaches its zero interest 
rate bound.  However, unlike Woodford, the fiscal effect comes only from a wealth effect 
                                                 
8 Siedman reports that Bernanke personally adheres to the Humphrey Hawkins dual mandate unreservedly 
and that inflation targeting does not sacrifice employment for price stability. 
9 Laurence Seidman has argued that Bernanke’s writings and speeches are much more lucid than Alan 
Greenspan and that “after Bernanke has established his anti-inflationary credentials, he will adopt a policy 
that balances concerns over unemployment and inflation” (Seidman 2006, p. 19).  It is interesting to note 
that Bernanke’s first major challenge two years after his appointment as Federal Reserve Chairman is to 
fight a severe financial meltdown and probable recession, a la Japan.  There are increasing indications that 
inflationary pressures lurk in the background, but Bernanke has chosen to aggressively cut interest rates 
and orchestrate various financial bailouts, rather than fight rising prices at the present time. 
  19via a money drop (not via a bond drop); such a helicopter drop of money can occur when 
the Fed facilitates a money financed government tax cut.  
 
2.1  Quantitative Easing 
Before we look at this effect, it is worth keeping in mind that the objective here is 
quantitative easing, which could be carried out by the Central Bank in several different 
ways. For Bernanke, as for traditional monetarists, the money supply will increase as a 
result of Open Market Operations, when the Central Bank buys short-term debt from the 
private sector and supplies reserves. Bernanke suggests however, that in a Japanese style 
recession, alternative quantitative easing may be necessary via non-traditional OMOs 
when the Fed buys long-term government debt and brings long-term interest rates to zero 
(Bernanke 2003b).
10 But this is still in the realm of monetary policy and, as already 
discussed, the NEC believes that the Fed does not have exogenous control over the 
money supply.  
Central Bank quantitative easing via purchases of various short- or long-term 
assets may not work since the Central Bank has “no unilateral authority to rain money on 
the population” (Bernanke 1999, p. 22).  But a quantitative easing via a money-financed 
tax cut can be undertaken via fiscal channels (Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack 2004, p. 20). 
Think George W. Bush’s tax rebate checks.  
Bernanke argues that the Fed can accomplish such a quantitative easing through a 
fiscal money drop, i.e. via money-financed government stimuli, among which he prefers 
tax cuts. Resorting to fiscal policy is necessary because even with the alternative 
monetary policy, even if the Fed is able to buy short or long term assets from the banking 
system, there is no guarantee that the extra reserves it supplies will find productive uses, 
i.e. that this new cash will be redirected into the hands of consumers and investors. This 
may happen either because banks are still unwilling to lend or because individuals are 
still unwilling to borrow.  A bank loan even at a 0 % rate of interest still needs to be 
repaid, while a tax rebate puts cash in the hands of households, with no strings attached. 
                                                 
10 Note that this is exactly what Bernanke has been doing in early 2008 to rescue the economy. He is 
implementing non-traditional OMOs and is allowing banks to use bad mortgage assets as collateral for 
borrowing from the Fed. In addition, he seems to be extending Lender of Last Resort assistance not only to 
commercial banks but to investment banks as well. 
  20For such a quantitative easing to occur, some intra-governmental cooperation is required 
(Bernanke 2003b, p. 23). So how do we accomplish such a “money financed tax cut”? 
Bernanke answers: 
 
Under a fiat (that is, paper) money system, a government (in practice, the central 
bank in cooperation with other agencies) should always be able to generate 
increased nominal spending and inflation, even when the short-term nominal 
interest rate is at zero. . . . The U.S. government has a technology, called a 
printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent) that allows it to produce as 
many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. (Bernanke 2002) 
 
In other words the Central Bank will finance the government policy by creating 
electronic credits to tax payer accounts and by providing the requisite reserves. Bernanke 
further argues that these tax cuts will be spent and not saved (which is similar to 
Woodford’s wealth effect in non-Ricardian regimes). Bernanke continues:  
 
In practice, the effectiveness of anti-deflation policy could be significantly 
enhanced by cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities. A broad-
based tax cut, for example, accommodated by a program of open-market 
purchases to alleviate any tendency for interest rates to increase, would almost 
certainly be an effective stimulant to consumption and hence to prices. . . . A 
money-financed tax cut is essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman’s famous 
“helicopter drop” of money. (ibid.) 
 
Thus Friedman’s helicopter drop is reincarnated in the New Consensus via fiscal 
policy. From Bernanke’s analysis, cash in the hands of people creates the wealth effect 
(not bonds, as in Woodford). One could argue, therefore, that there is no particular reason 
why fiscal policy should involve tax cuts; spending too could theoretically do the job.  
But the strong supply side bent in the NEC continues to favor tax cuts and there are few 
who argue for government spending as a stabilizing tool (e.g. Leith and Wren-Lewis 





  212.2  Wealth Effect and Expectations 
For Bernanke the wealth effect occurs not from persuading the public to buy government 
bonds but from literally raining money on them via a money-financed tax cut (such as 
Bush’s tax rebate checks). 
If we compare Bernanke’s version of fiscal policy effectiveness with Woodford’s, 
we find them to be very similar, although Bernanke clearly argues for a fiscal money 
drop, while Woodford believes that both a money and bond drop have an effect. Both 
policies are effective because they increase net nominal wealth. Bernanke also prefers the 
money financed tax cut, because this policy does not increase total government debt. He 
explains this effect in the context of Japan’s latest recession: 
 
Consider, for example, a tax cut for households and businesses that is explicitly 
coupled with incremental Bank of Japan purchases of government debt—that the 
tax cut is in effect financed by money creation. Moreover, assume that the Bank 
of Japan has made a commitment, by announcing a price level target, to reflate the 
economy, so that much or all of the increase in the money stock is viewed as 
permanent. . . . Under this plan . . . the government’s concerns about its 
outstanding stock of debt are mitigated because increases in its debt are purchased 
by the BOJ [Bank of Japan] rather than sold to the private sector. Moreover, 
consumers and businesses should be willing to spend rather than save the bulk of 
their tax cut: They have extra cash on hand, but—because the BOJ purchased 
government debt in the amount of the tax cut—no current or future debt service 
burden has been created to imply increased future taxes. Essentially, monetary 
and fiscal policies together have increased the nominal wealth of the household 
sector, which will increase nominal spending and hence prices. The health of the 
banking sector is irrelevant to this means of transmitting the expansionary effect 
of monetary policy. (Bernanke 2003b, quoted in Seidman 2006)
11 
 
The important choice theoretic point of agreement between Woodford and 
Bernake, however, is that the wealth effect depends on expectations. Bernanke is quick to 
point out that this policy will work so long as taxpayers perceive the tax cut to be a 
permanent windfall, which will not be offset by future tax increases. In fact, precisely 
because the Central Bank is purchasing the government debt, there is no need to raise 
taxes to repay it at a later date. So rational agents understand this to be a permanent 
                                                 
11 Note that Bernanke adds another important reason why fiscal policy is potent. The financial system may 
be in disarray and monetary policy through the usual transmission mechanisms will not work, not only 
because of the zero interest rate bound, but also due to the poor health of the financial system. However, 
with a money-financed tax cut, fiscal policy sidesteps the financial difficulties and offers a direct stimulus. 
  22increase in their incomes. The job of policy is not only to be non-Ricardian but also to 
communicate this regime to the public. If fiscal policy is transparent it too can anchor 
expectations appropriately. 
 
2.3  Inflation and Expectations 
The role of expectations in fact delineates the difference between the money drop under 
Monetarism, where it produces a money illusion and the money drop in the New 
Economic Consensus.  The New Consensus mechanism is reminiscent of the early 
“money illusion” adjustment, except that now it is couched in rational expectations terms. 
Previously, an exogenous increase in the money supply was perceived by agents to be an 
actual boon to nominal incomes. Suffering from adaptive expectations and not realizing 
that this increase in the money supply is only inflationary, agents increase their spending, 
which pushes prices up and neutralizes the effect of the increased demand. Full 
employment is reestablished but with higher prices. In Monetarism we have past-binding 
expectations, which generate money illusion that causes consumers to spend more. In the 
NEC rational and forward looking agents face, not an exogenous increase in the money 
supply, but an exogenous increase in government spending. Instead of a monetary 
helicopter money drop, we now have a fiscal helicopter bond or money drop. Rational 
agents are not “fooled,” instead they understand that the bond drop will not be offset in 
the future. They boost spending until the wealth effect dissipates as prices rise. Long-
term equilibrium is restored.  
The difference between the old monetarist transmission mechanism and the one in 
the NEC is that inflation is due to forward-looking expectations, which alter the 
consumption behavior of optimizing agents. The size of the bond drop will determine the 
inflationary impact of deficit spending, so long as fiscal policy is transparent and 
expectations are well anchored, i.e. so long as households understand what the size of the 
deficit is and whether it will be offset or not. The reason why demand increases relative 
to supply (and produces the inflationary effect) is because we face labor market (or other) 
rigidities, which prevent the system from equilibrating immediately to full employment. 
Fiscal policy has an effect on output and inflation.  
  23According to Bernanke, the NEC view coheres with the old monetarist 
interpretation in that inflation is seen as the result of “overissuance of nominal 
government liabilities” (Bernanke 2003c, p. 211).   It seems Bernanke is not ready to give 
up the old quantity equation relationship, which leads to similar conclusions. In the NEC 
it does not matter whether government finances spending by bonds or by printing money, 
excessive amounts of each will be inflationary.  
Both Woodford and Bernanke are still unable to escape their sound finance 
background. They are both making the case for fiscal policy only in extraordinary 
circumstances. Otherwise, they advocate sound fiscal discipline. Bernanke believes that 
fiscal policy must be sound to anchor expectations in the short run which would make it 
more potent during recessions (Seidman 2006, p. 27). The inflationary impact of fiscal 
policy in Woodford also motivates fiscal discipline and commitment to certain debt limits 
(2000, p. 71). 
The choice-theoretic foundations in Bernanke, Woodford and other NEC 
economists are clear: fiscal policy would operate as a supply-side or demand-side tool 
depending on how it impacts incentives and expectations. Fiscal policy through 
Woodford’s bond drop or Bernanke’s fiscal money drop works as a policy of managing 
expectations. All of the above-mentioned effects will be nullified if rational agents do not 
find fiscal policy credible and expect a reversal in the stimulus. Fiscal policy manages 
inflation by anchoring expectations appropriately.  
It is not enough for fiscal and monetary policy to select the right policy stance; 
they must also make rational agents believe that these are the proper policies. Credibility 
and transparency are crucial not only for monetary policy but for fiscal policy as well. 
This is why fiscal policy rules have been suggested in place of discretion. While fiscal 
and monetary rules are preferred, Bernanke argues that in a deflationary environment, 
fiscal policy should dominate and discretionary tax cuts can be of great help. These cuts 
need to be immediate, temporary, with long lead lags, and should not cause major 
changes in the federal government’s structural budget deficit (Bernanke 2008). 
To conclude, issues of government finance in the NEC are crucial. It is slowly 
being understood that in the context of endogenous money/interest rate maintenance 
regime, governments do not face technical/operational constraints to spending. Yet, 
  24notions of sound finance and intertemporal budget constraints pervade New Consensus 
thinking to the detriment of genuine understanding of the stabilizing potential of fiscal 
policy in an endogenous money context. 
 
3. FISCAL POLICY AND FULL EMPLOYMENT IN THE NEW ECONOMIC 
CONSENSUS 
 
The final point to consider is what, if any, is the connection between fiscal policy and full 
employment. According to Seidman (2006), Bernanke claims to adhere strictly to the 
Humphrey-Hawkins mandate. In general, however, even those calls in favor of fiscal 
policy as a stabilization tool, do not explicitly link it to the goal of securing full 
employment. There are two reasons for this enduring split between fiscal policy and 
employment concerns. One is theoretical and the other is methodological. In the New 
Consensus, the choice theoretic micro-foundations of macro-outcomes authenticate 
employment determination solely as a function of the optimizing behavior of hyper-
rational individuals.  Policy may be able to affect employment outcomes as long as it is 
able to influence individual behavior.  
When Keynes made the connection between fiscal policy and full employment, he 
was concerned with how to eliminate involuntary unemployment. In the NEC, the 
dynamic general equilibrium model (originally developed by Real Business Cycle 
theorists and later embraced by New Keynesians) does not permit the study of 
involuntary unemployment. In fact, because of methodological necessity, the type of 
unemployment that NEC framework is able to model is frictional, i.e. purely voluntary 
(Zouache 2004). Zouache explains how in the NEC, the search framework of analyzing 
employment issues, necessarily means that unemployment is voluntary: 
 
[T]he convergence of New Keynesian Economics and Real Business Cycle theory 
has a consequence on the conception of unemployment in macroeconomics, 
particularly with regard to dynamic general equilibrium models amended with a 
matching function. The unemployed are then defined as workers without jobs and 
looking for new jobs (and the vacancy as unemployed jobs looking for workers). 
Unemployment is temporary in dynamic matching models since «most 
unemployed individuals have been employed at some point in the past» 
(Rogerson 1997, 78). Unemployment is temporary because the worker will have a 
  25job in the future. “With the exception of a few ‘discouraged’ workers, 
unemployed workers are always between jobs, or between some other state and a 
job” (Pissarides 2000, xv). This quotation confirms that unemployment is 
temporary and will last only a given period of time. (ibid.,  pp. 111-112) 
 
Zouache argues that unemployment appears to be “voluntary in dynamic models 
with a matching function because separations between firms and workers are desired by 
both” (ibid., p.112). In other words, there is no way of telling whether the individual left 
the workplace voluntarily or is involuntarily unemployed. If a worker leaves a firm, he 
could take back his position at a wage that would facilitate the matching between him 
(the now unemployed) and his firm (the now vacant job), but he has voluntarily left his 
job. If at some point in the future, he decides that he is all too happy to exchange his 
situation (of voluntary unemployment) with someone who is employed, it would appear 
as though he is involuntarily unemployed since he now wants that job. In short, we 
cannot tell the difference between voluntary and involuntary unemployment (ibid.). 
Zouache also points out that the NEC adopts the long standing Lucas belief 
(echoed by Blanchard 2000) that involuntary unemployment has no place in the 
macroeconomic research program (Zouache 2004, p. 113). Zouache concludes:  
 
New NeoClassical Synthesis could be interpreted as the final step of the process 
that will lead to the end of the concept of involuntary unemployment in 
macroeconomic research… Now a methodology is not neutral since it is based 
upon a set of theoretical and quantitative tools more or less suited to the analysis 
of certain issues. And the emerging methodological consensus in macroeconomics 
will necessarily lead to the study of certain conceptual issues and to the neglect of 
others. In particular, it seems that the New NeoClassical Synthesis will definitely 
exclude the concept of involuntary unemployment from the research agenda of 
future macroeconomics. (ibid., pp. 113-114) 
 
This is a very grim view of the limited possibilities the NEC leaves us with 
respect to policy to deal with unemployment. It should be noted that not everyone 
subscribes to the Lucas view that involuntary unemployment is irrelevant (e.g., as early 
as 1989 Mankiw has argued that it exists and economists must study it). But if the NEC is 
not capable methodologically to deal with this concept, then the only goal for fiscal or 
monetary policy is to correct short-term fluctuations around full employment. Once 
  26again, the transmission mechanism for their effect is through the expectations and 
behavior of rational individuals. 
Involuntary unemployment was raison d’etre for Keynes’s revolutionary theory. 
The NEC fiscal policy has little to do with Keynes’s theoretical contributions and nothing 
in common with his policy recommendations.  
 
4. THE POST-KEYNESIAN APPROACH TO FISCAL POLICY: FUNCTIONAL 
FINANCE 
 
From the discussion so far it is clear that there is a role for fiscal policy in the NEC 
although it is not aimed at solving involuntary unemployment. Furthermore, it is also 
clear that NEC is an inherently monetary regime. Fiscal policy is expected to take a back 
seat to monetary policy and exercise fiscal discipline in normal circumstances. This view 
is reinforced by the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level where fiscal effects are especially 
destabilizing in inflation-fighting regimes. Although the role of fiscal policy in the NEC 
is far from established, the Post-Keynesian School of Thought has long believed that it is 
by far the more potent tool for macroeconomic coordination and stabilization.  
The shape and form of fiscal policy in the Post-Keynesian literature however is not 
entirely clear either, although there is more consensus here than in the mainstream. Most 
recent Post-Keynesian calls for fiscal policy resurrect Abba Lerner’s functional finance 
approach (Lerner 1943). For Lerner fiscal policy was to be judged not by ex-post 
budgetary results, but by its real effects on the economy. He also explained how 
governments faced no limits to spending and argued that it was the role of the fiscal 
authority to spend as much as it was necessary to bring the economy to full employment.  
In recent Post-Keynesian contributions, however, we can broadly distinguish 
between two specific types of functional finance. One argues that the primary objective 
of fiscal policy is to secure full employment and the best way to do this is via a universal 
job guarantee. The other supports injecting as much aggregate demand as necessary to 
close the output gap but without an explicit guarantee to provide jobs for all. We shall 
call them functional finance via job creation and functional finance via aggregate 
demand.  This section summarizes these two approaches and considers how they compare 
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demand, since deficient aggregate demand has been a long-standing Post-Keynesian 
concern. 
 
4.1  Functional Finance via Aggregate Demand (FFAD) 
This is by far the most common approach to fiscal policy within the Post-Keynesian 
camp. Recent contributions include that of Robert Eisner (2003), who had often argued 
that flawed notions about the federal deficit leave aggregate demand in a too restrictive 
stance (Eisner 1986). Colander and Matthews (2006) also claim that budgets are only 
accounting phenomena and taxing and spending must be adjusted in an anti-cyclical 
manner with a focus on their economic impacts.
12 Arestis and Sawyer have perhaps most 
explicitly made the case for fiscal policy via functional finance, where the task of 
government policy specifically is to secure high levels of aggregate demand, when 
private demand is deficient (2003).  
One of the distinctive features of the FFAD approach is that the objective of fiscal 
policy is to close the demand gap. To this end, Arestis and Sawyer are two advocates of 
functional finance who believe that this approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
New Economic Consensus (2004). Fontana (2008) for example argues that the NEC 
model can be easily amended by replacing the output gap equation (the IS equation) with 
one that specifies the output gap as a function of real government expenditures. Others, 
too, have attempted to model fiscal policy within NEC by adding new equations to the 
mix or modifying them. Setterfield (2007), for example, offers a pseudo-Taylor rule as a 
function of the public sector borrowing requirement. Arestis and Sawyer (2004) have also 
made amendments to the NEC model in a similar vein.  
For most Post-Keynesians, filling the demand gap is the goal, but that gap—the 
difference between actual and potential output—is not the same thing as the one in the 
New Consensus. For the latter, potential output is that which is achieved under perfectly 
                                                 
12 Although they recommend sound finance in expansions and functional finance in contractions. 
  28flexible prices and wages. For the former, it is a measure of full employment, where the 
Keynesian type of involuntary unemployment has been eliminated
13.  
Arestis and Sawyer are the main advocates of the functional finance approach via 
aggregate demand management. In Arestis and Sawyer 2004, the authors critique a series 
of NEC assumptions that undermine fiscal policy effectiveness. In particular, they reject 
the crowding out effect and add to the critiques of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.  
One of the main reasons why crowding out does not occur is because the interest rate (in 
an endogenous money system) is under the direct control of the monetary authority.  
Ricardian equivalence is also untenable. The two authors argue that the main 
problem with Ricardian equivalence is that it assumes full employment. If however the 
economy operates below that level, savings will exceed investment and budget deficits 
could be used to “mop up” these savings and close the demand gap. Thus, it is deficit 
spending that can bring the economy to full employment, and because it is accomplished 
by mopping up savings, it appears as though the windfall from deficits was saved by 
households. In other words, the excess saving/deficit spending relationship is simply an 
ex post accounting identity.  If crowding out and Ricardian equivalence are irrelevant, the 
authors argue, there is room for fiscal policy. The type of fiscal policy that they advocate 
is one that encourages investment and growth.  
 
Fiscal Policy of the ‘functional finance’ type boosts aggregate demand, and 
thereby has a stimulating impact on investment, which raises the future productive 
capacity of the economy. Further, some advocates of ‘functional finance’ have 
viewed public sector investment as a form of expenditure, which can be varied 
according to the state of private demand, and to the extent to which the budget 
deficit permits additional public investment there can also be a boost to future 
productive capacity (this, of course, will depend on the nature of the investment, 
for example investment in roads or in defense equipment and the productivity of 
that investment. The growth rate may thereby be favorably enhanced by fiscal 
policy. (Arestis and Sawyer 2004, p. 139) 
 
The essential feature of this functional finance approach is that it rests on 1) 
increasing aggregate demand, 2) stimulating investment, 3) increasing productive 
capacity, and thereby favoring growth. This is a pro-investment pro-growth policy, which 
                                                 
13 Recall that in the Keynesian tradition, flexible wages and prices do not guarantee full employment but 
may actually increase unemployment. 
  29aims to offset or reduce the demand gap. This policy is not wedded to particular types of 
public spending or public investment. These could range from defense spending to 
building roads, and the type of fiscal stimulus would depend on the state of and shortfall 
in private demand as well as on the productivity of existing investment. 
For Arestis and Sawyer, the main virtue of functional finance is that it always 
raises demand (unlike in the NEC, where fiscal policy has demand side effects only in 
non-Ricardian regimes).  Functional finance raises “the level of aggregate demand, where 
it would otherwise be too low, while leaving open what level of economic activity is 
regarded as optimum or desirable” (ibid., p. 132). 
The case for fiscal policy is made when there is deficiency in aggregate demand, 
“below that required for the target level of economic activity.” Although the authors 
argue that functional finance can be used to secure full employment, this is by no means a 
pre-condition to exercise functional finance. Deficit spending will always raise economic 
activity, but nothing binds the fiscal authority to pursue full employment, although 
Arestis and Sawyer argue strongly in favor of functional finance for full employment.  It 
is aggregate demand that determines the level of investment and it is investment that 
determines the level of employment. Therefore the authors argue: “in terms of policy 
implications, appropriate demand policies are required to stimulate investment and 
underpin full employment” (ibid., p. 97). But complications arise when the economy runs 
into its inflation barrier, which is (by the authors’ admission) somewhat similar to the 
NAIRU, although it can fluctuate for many different reasons (tied to supply or demand 
side constraints). Inflation for Post-Keynesians is not the same thing as inflation in the 
NEC. Arestis and Sawyer offer a structuralist view of inflation, which is rooted in the 
Post-Keynesian administered price framework and depends on a series of factors such as 
capacity utilization and the evolution of capital stock.  
The implication of this analysis is that, in an economy with a changing inflation 
barrier, full employment would be given by the level of employment when aggregate 
demand runs into this inflation barrier. So there may be many different levels of full 
employment, depending on the level of aggregate demand and on the location of the 
inflation barrier. By implication the condition where all who want jobs are gainfully 
employed is but one level of full employment among many. For the two authors the 
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output. Although, by their own admission, this is somewhat similar to the NEC definition 
of the NAIRU, they are critical of the latter concept and its fixed supply assumption. For 
Arestis and Sawyer output and inflation are determined by different Post-Keynesian 
forces, but the end result is quite similar—at a certain point we run into an inflation 
barrier where any further reduction in unemployment is inflationary. The functional 
finance approach via aggregate demand management has a floating definition of full 
employment, depending on the underlying economic conditions and the composition of 
aggregate demand relative to the choice of technique and capacity utilization.  
Arestis and Sawyer recognize that in some cases the non-inflationary full 
employment level will still involve a large number of involuntarily unemployed 
individuals. In this case the aggregate demand approach will not help. Thus, they argue 
that aggregate demand is only a necessary although not a sufficient condition to achieve 
low levels of involuntary unemployment. To reduce this kind of unemployment, the 
authors believe that some collective wage determination and price setting is needed, as 
well as expansion of productive capacity and heavy investment in areas with large 
unemployment. This is an approach that is driven by growth, investment and demand or 
supply side expansions to achieve full employment. But there is no explicit commitment 
to secure jobs for all; in fact such a policy is explicitly rejected by Sawyer (2003).  
With respect to the NEC model, Arestis and Sawyer reject the crowding out 
effect, Ricardian equivalence, and the fixed supply assumptions in making their case for 
fiscal policy. A final word must be said about government finance.  The two authors 
argue that the NEC treats the growth rate as given, but in a dynamic Post-Keynesian 
approach growth rates would change, and thus fiscal policy need not run against 
traditional budget constraints. Also they recognize Lerner’s claim that government debt 
and deficits are forever sustainable because “the interest can be paid by borrowing still 
more” (Lerner 1943, p. 356). However the authors favor a different kind of definition for 
sustainability. Government budgets are sustainable so long as the rate of economic 
growth exceeds the post-tax rate of interest on debt (Arestis and Sawyer 2004, p. 151). 
They also argue that such sustainability is empirically validated. Similar to the NEC, they 
believe that an overly tight monetary policy can undermine sustainability but posit a 
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nominal debt in a non-Ricardian regime, making it even more inflationary, and possibly 
hyperinflationary. For Arestis and Sawyer, tight monetary policy has an indirect effect on 
investment and output, which undermines growth (relative to the interest on debt) and 
thus the sustainability of the primary budget deficit (ibid.). 
These are some of the main features of the functional finance approach via 
aggregate demand management.  The core proposition is to boost aggregate demand, 
investment and growth to underpin full employment. This is by no means a novel view 
and there is a long tradition in Post-Keynesian economics that supports it. One of the 
main virtues of this approach is that it has explicitly contrasted the Post-Keynesian view 
of fiscal policy effectiveness with the NEC view of relative fiscal policy ineffectiveness. 
We now turn to the approach to functional finance via direct job creation 
 
4.2  Functional Finance via Direct Job Creation (FFJC) 
Fiscal policy through direct job creation is also not new. Keynes’s public works for 
example are just such a policy. Many of Keynes’s contemporaries had called for the 
government to guarantee full employment (see for example Pierson 1941 and Beveridge 
1945). This could be done, some argued, if the government acted as an employer of last 
resort (ELR). The ELR proposal as it is discussed in the modern literature comes to us 
from the work of Hyman Minsky (1986). A similar proposal has also been developed in 
Mitchell (1998) and Wray (1998). What is new in this approach is that it makes an 
explicit link between guaranteeing employment and government finance (see Mosler 
1997-98). The latter is largely informed by Knapp’s State Theory of Money (1924) and 
Lerner’s view of money as a creature of the state (1947).  It is argued that Lerner’s 
functional finance approach must take the form of not just any type of spending, but of 
guaranteeing employment (Forstater 1999). In fact it is explicitly rejected that full 
employment depends on increasing aggregate demand, rather it depends on an open-
ended guarantee of an employment opportunity (Mitchell and Wray 2004). 
This approach, unlike the one above, does not have a floating (non inflationary 
definition) of full employment. Full employment here is the condition where all who are 
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14  The 
supporters of this approach generally come from the Post-Keynesian camp known as 
Neo-Chartalism
15, which emphasizes two key points with respect to fiscal policy: 1) there 
are no inherent borrowing or taxing constraints to government finance in sovereign 
currency nations, and 2) the link between fiscal policy and full employment must be 
made explicit. 
This approach embraces Lerner’s proposition that government budgets should be 
judged by their effects and not by their size (Lerner 1943). Furthermore, they argue that 
because deficits and the debt are always ex-post accounting results, fiscal policy that aims 
to hit a particular deficit/debt target is wholly misguided (Tcherneva 2006a). Instead, 
fiscal policy should aim to achieve full employment by ensuring that all who want jobs 
are gainfully employed. They also believe that delivering true full employment via 
stimulating aggregate demand maybe a very difficult, if not impossible, thing to do. Thus, 
to ensure that fiscal policy is always consistent with full employment, the latter must be 
explicitly guaranteed. 
 
4.2.1 Government  Finance 
For advocates of functional finance via direct job creation, misconceptions of government 
finance is the single most important obstacle to achieving important social objectives 
such as full employment.
16 Under no circumstances does a federal government in a 
sovereign currency regime with flexible exchange rates face spending constraints, unless 
such constraints are self-imposed (legislatively or otherwise). And even in those cases as, 
for example, illustrated in the case of the U.S., these legal deficit/debt limits are often 
adjusted when the government desires to finance initiatives, such as the War in Iraq.  
This approach stresses that our understanding of monetary and fiscal policy, as 
well as the interaction between the two, in an endogenous money system is incomplete 
without also understanding that money is what Lerner (1947) called “a creature of the 
                                                 
14 Some have argued that this base wage should be a living wage (Tcherneva and Wray 2005). 
15 Neo-Chartalists resurrect a historically grounded approach to money, emphasizing the historical fact that 
money has always been delimited by proclamation. It comes from the word “charta.” This approach comes 
from Knapp (1924), which was endorsed by Keynes (1930). 
16 Some have used the functional finance approach to show that other socially desirable goals such as 
universal social security or medicare can be achieved once we understand the role of government finance 
(Bell and Wray 2000; Niggle 2003). 
  33state.” As Bernanke so presciently put it, the government has at its disposal a tool of 
finance that is not available to any private agent—that is the printing press or its modern 
electronic equivalent. And as Woodford has also recognized there are no technical limits 
to government spending when that spending is denominated in the government’s own 
liabilities.    
Any point of agreement between Neo-Chartalists and NEC rests on this particular 
notion of government finance and the unique nature of government liabilities (the 
implications of which, to emphasize, are still vigorously debated within the NEC). One 
aspect of Neo-Chartalism that has not been recognized by the NEC is that the purpose of 
taxes is not to finance spending but to create demand for government provided money (it 
is also unclear whether supporters of functional finance via aggregate demand make use 
of this important mechanism, as it has not been discussed much in their work). As the 
father of the modern U.S. paper currency Ben Franklin had argued, paper money derives 
its value from the future taxes that the government collects (Grubb 2006).
17 In other 
words, in a world where government liabilities are used for private sector transactions, 
the provision of these liabilities to the public via government spending comes first and 
taxation follows later. Furthermore, in modern economies with sovereign control over its 
fiat currency, the purpose of bond sales is not to finance government spending, but to 
drain unneeded reserves from the banking system and offer an interest-bearing 
alternative. Bond sales are the interest maintenance vehicle of an interest-targeting 
monetary authority (see Fullwiler 2006 for technical analysis). 
Note here that Woodford’s treatment of money could be made consistent with the 
Neo-Chartalist view: 
 
[N]o one would doubt the ability of a government to issue an arbitrary amount of 
currency, without any commitment to retiring it from circulation (e.g., by running 
                                                 
17 There is a large body of literature on the history of money, that studies societies as far back as Ancient 
Egypt and Mesopotamia to the monetization of Africa or modern currencies (e.g. Hudson 2003, Henry 
2004, Forstater 2005). This literature has demonstrated that money predates markets and was always 
established as a unit of account first, and means of payment and medium of exchange second, which in turn 
was only possible with the intervention of some central/public authority. Understanding of history is 
important because it elucidates that taxes create demand for a particular currency and never “finance” 
government spending. The government can choose anything to serve as money by simply declaring that it 
will serve to extinguish debt to the government such as taxes. Taxes do not finance spending; they only 
create demand for what is seemingly useless paper. (See Wray 1998 for the theoretical development of the 
“taxes-drive-money” approach and Tcherneva 2006a for a succinct summary.) 
  34budget surpluses) at some later date. Market participants do not consider whether 
newly issued government liabilities of this kind exceed some bound on what it is 
considered prudent for the government to issue before deciding whether to accept 
them as payment for real goods and services; instead, each agent makes an 
individual decision about the terms on which to accept such government paper, 
that depend upon the expected rate of return on the asset in equilibrium. 
(Woodford 2000, pp. 32-33) 
 
The difference here is that for Neo-Chartalists the return on this asset must also 
include at the margin the tax liability that a private agent can extinguish by delivering 
this government liability to the government. Government provided money is the means of 
settling the non-reciprocal obligation the population faces (i.e. the tax) and also 
represents a source of net saving for the private sector, the desire for which can be a 
bottomless sink. Hoarding of net financial assets, in the Post-Keynesian tradition 
produces unemployment, thus Neo-Chartalist argue, there is no inherent need for the 
government to restrict the supply of its own liabilities; rather it can supply them in a 
manner consistent with full employment (e.g. via a direct job guarantee). But there is an 
inherent need for the government to set the terms of exchange on which it will provide its 
own currency to the private sector. In other words, by contrast with Woodford, Neo-
Chartalists would argue that is not the private sector that should make the decision about 
“the terms on which to accept such government paper,” but rather it is the monopoly 
issuer that must stipulate how its liabilities will be provided in order to ensure that 
government spending or lending is not inflationary (more below). 
It is worth emphasizing that, although “printing money” is decried by many 
economists, in reality, this is the only way in which modern governments (as in the U.S.) 
spend. They spend by electronically crediting bank accounts or by mailing checks, which 
the Central Bank then clears. This results in a net injection of reserves, which will be 
leveraged depending on the private sector spending/investment needs. Whatever reserves 
remain idle and in excess in the banking system will be drained by Federal Reserve open 
market sales to maintain the nominal rate of interest.
18 As Woodford has pointed out, in 
equilibrium, someone will always end up holding the debt. This does not mean that the 
private sector has financed government spending; rather, the private sector’s liquidity 
                                                 
18 The destabilizing effect of government spending and taxation on the level of reserves has been illustrated 
by Bell and Wray (2003).  
  35preference has resulted in a certain distribution of the net new financial assets between 
bonds and base money.  The level of government debt is endogenously determined. More 
importantly, however, government spending always results in a crowding in effect, since 
the net injection of high powered money, ceteris paribus, causes the interest rate to fall.
19 
It is monetary policy that does the crowding out, not fiscal deficits. There are various 
institutional structures, such as tax and loan accounts in the U.S., that exist to minimize 
the effect of government spending on reserves (see Bell 2000 for details). They do not 
change the fact that government spending always results in net credits to the private 
sector. 
So while Bernanke and Woodford recognize that the government faces no 
spending constraints, they do not make full use of this knowledge when discussing fiscal 
policy. The only need to crank up the printing press for Bernanke is in extreme 
deflationary circumstances as in Japan, not acknowledging that government always 
spends by creating electronic credits to the banking system. The functional finance via 
direct job creation supporters contend that there is no operational government budget 
constraint in sovereign currency nations and that this condition should constitute the 
benchmark for any subsequent analysis of the effects of fiscal policy. 
Once this condition has been recognized, debates about government budget 
sustainability make little sense. The only sense in which it is important is when it means 
solvency (similar to what Allsopp and Vines 2005 argued above). For FFJC advocates, a 
government budget will be unsustainable if it has voluntarily given up its sovereign 
control over its currency (via dollarization, monetary unions, currency boards, or other 
fixed exchange rate regimes), which puts into question its solvency at the limit. 
Finally, with respect to Ricardian equivalence, similar to the Aresits and Sawyer 
approach above, we can only speak of some accounting identity specifying the 
relationship of stocks and flows in the system. Here the Godley-Lavoie (2007) stock-flow 
consistent approach is key in underscoring the fact that government saving is always 
offset by non-government dis-saving. Put differently, government deficit spending 
always results in private sector savings. This is slightly different from the FFAD 
                                                 
19 See Benjamin Friedman (1978) as one of the earliest arguments on the crowding in effect of government 
spending. 
  36approach in interpretation. Both approaches adopt Kalecki’s profits relationship and 
Godley’s sector balances approach, but in the FFAD analysis, savings somehow run 
ahead of investment (or investment falls short of savings) and government deficits are 
there to “mop them up” and fill in the demand gap. Although these are all ex-post 
relationships, this presentation obscures the fact that government deficit spending (even 
in conditions of full employment) will always create savings, rather than “mop them” up. 
Households then, as Keynes had argued, will decide how they wish to hold these savings. 
If they decide that they do not wish to hold cash but prefer an interest-bearing alternative, 
government debt is issued to absorb these cash balances and offer this alternative. This is 
a more useful way of viewing any sort of “mopping up” that may occur – only in the 
sense of interest rate maintenance. And then it would be the debt, and not the deficit, that 
does the “mopping up.” Both FFAG and FFJC adopt the three sector balances identity, 
but the difference is in the interpretation of government spending and causality. For both 
approaches, Ricardian equivalence only illustrates some ex-post accounting relationship. 
It says nothing about the impact of government deficits on private activity. 
All approaches (Woodford’s version of NEC, functional finance via aggregate 
demand, and functional finance via job creation) agree on one thing: the amount of debt 
in existence is an equilibrium condition, as in equilibrium someone has to hold the debt.  
But unlike the NEC, the existence of debt for Post-Keynesians says little about how 
consumers have been affected by government deficit spending. Post-Keynesians would 
argue for example, that Bernanke’s money-tax cut would produce a windfall to incomes, 
which may or may not increase spending (e.g. it may go to the repayment of private 
sector debt). With respect to Woodford’s net bond injection, Post-Keynesians would 
argue that it need not produce a wealth effect a la New Economic Consensus. In fact a 
rush to bonds usually occurs when returns from investments in productive projects do not 
materialize, i.e. when private spending falls. Some Neo-Chartalists think that the 
immediate effect of a very tight monetary policy may be stimulative, if it is associated 
with large levels of publicly held debt (Bell-Kelton and Ballinger 2005). This is the case 
since government interest payments on this debt are a net injection of money (financial 
assets) in the economy which may produce some wealth effect similar to the one in the 
New Consensus. One could argue that, at some point (probably sooner rather than later), 
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and consumption to a greater degree than could be offset by any boost to incomes from 
interest on debt (see also Fullwiler 2005). 
The above analysis is also important with regard to the assumed inflationary 
effect of government spending. If a wealth effect does not materialize or is quickly 
reversed there need not be any inflation. But government spending need not be 
inflationary also for purely Post-Keynesian reasons. Another way of seeing this effect is 
to argue that the private sector’s desire to net save is such that it absorbs all new financial 
assets without producing an increase its expenditures. Furthermore, we have a system of 
administered prices and idle capacity, where a boost to demand may not increase the 
overall price level. 
Inflation is not an inherent feature of fiscal policy. For Neo-Chartalists, inflation 
is affected (although not determined) by the total injections of credits (government 
spending) into the economy relative to the total withdrawals (government taxation). This 
simple relationship between government spending and taxation does not imply that 
deficits are necessarily inflationary and that surpluses are deflationary. Although certain 
types of fiscal policies can impart a strong inflationary bias on the economy, such as 
basic income guarantees (for more details see Tcherneva 2006b), inflation is by no means 
a sure result from all government policies. Inflation will also depend on the underlying 
economic conditions, the level of private spending and the type of production and 
employment. In general, for Neo-Chartalists, the value of the currency is affected by what 
one must do to obtain it, and if one need not do anything to get money (need not work, 
produce, deliver goods and services, or provide collateral), then money loses its value. 
This on the face of it should be rather obvious. What is harder to see is that, at the 
margin, if there is no tax liability, the government’s issue of liabilities will have no future 
backing. Taxes create demand for otherwise worthless government pieces of paper. 
Although this point about taxes is not understood by NEC authors, Neo-Chartalists will 
arrive at a conclusion similar to Bernanke’s, namely that excessive issue of government 
liabilities is inflationary, only when government spending relative to taxation has not 
been associated with a change in private sector activity.   
  38Now that we have explained why crowding out, Ricardian equivalence, or budget 
constraints are irrelevant to understanding the nature of government finance, we can 
move on to discuss the explicit link between fiscal policy and full employment 
 
4.2.2  Full Employment 
Once they have dispensed with false notions of government finance, advocates of this 
Functional finance approach want to ensure full employment via direct job creation. 
There are a number of proposals that can do the job, such as the employer of last resort 
(ELR) (Minsky 1986; Wray 1998), public service employment (Harvey 1989), and the 
buffer stock employment program (Mitchell 1998). These proposals have been advocated 
because of their macroeconomic merits and because of their human rights considerations. 
All proponents of this approach stand behind universal job guarantees because they view 
employment as a basic human right. Some advocates have also argued that the 
macroeconomic merits of the job guarantee surpass those of alternative universal 
guarantees, such as the basic income proposals (Harvey 2005; Mitchell and Watts 2004; 
Tcherneva 2006b). ELR advocates outline the following core advantages of this program. 
ELR can serve as a counter-cyclical stabilizer, which alleviates business cycle 
fluctuations without sacrificing full employment. It can serve as a buffer stock program 
that stabilizes the price (i.e. the wage) of the buffer stock (i.e. labor). To the extent that 
wages are an input to all production—private or public—it will also serve as the base 
wage for all industry and a stable anchor for all wages in the economy. Because of this 
mechanism, ELR itself is believed to be a non-inflationary full employment program. It is 
this buffer stock mechanism that also ensures that deficit spending fluctuates counter-
cyclically and is always at the “right” level. Guaranteeing full employment does not 
depend on ever-increasing deficits.  
To the extent that the job guarantee is universal, it will not only secure this most 
basic human right but will also anchor the value of the (fiat) currency by setting its terms 
of exchange at the margin, i.e. by establishing how many dollars would exchange for an 
hour of ELR work.  The main macroeconomic problem of modern capitalist economies—
namely unemployment—is solved outright, by guaranteeing a job to all who want to 
work at the base wage. But policy makers are responsible for designing public sector jobs 
  39and activities that deliver optimal socio-economic results. Through the ELR it is then 
easy to assess Lerner’s functional finance results; in other words, fiscal policy is to be 
judged by its economic impact and not by its budget stance. If for example, fiscal policy 
aims to address environmental degradation, then ELR should be designed with this goal 
in mind, e.g. by creating green jobs (see Forstater 2004 for details). If green results have 
not been delivered, then fiscal policy has failed. The impact of policy is assessed without 
sacrificing full employment. 
There are three important differences between these two approaches to functional 
finance. For advocates of direct job creation, increasing aggregate demand is not a 
necessary condition for full employment.
20 Additionally, they believe that given the 
endogenous evolution of demand and supply conditions, getting to full employment by 
closing the demand gap will likely fail. Finally, while pro-investment and pro-growth 
fiscal policies may be desirable on other grounds, they do not guarantee full employment 
in the short or long run, even if they can temporarily achieve it (Tcherneva 2008). To sum 
up, in the FFAG approach, full employment is an objective that must be underpinned by 
the level of investment via an increase in aggregate demand; it is therefore an indirect 
approach to full employment. In the Neo-Chartalist version of functional finance, fiscal 
policy eliminates unemployment outright and full employment is guaranteed by design; it 
is a direct approach to full employment.  Both approaches however aim to reestablish the 




Fiscal policy has had a checkered past. Keynes’s revolutionary theoretical approach 
erected an important place for fiscal policy—a place which was later dismantled by 
mainstream theory. And while the mainstream is trying to salvage some role for fiscal 
policy from the ashes, Post-Keynesians have long championed bona fide Keynesian 
ideas. In the final analysis, the New Economic Consensus places monetary policy at the 
helm of the economic steering wheel. For Post-Keynesians, in the true spirit of Lerner 
                                                 
20 Wray and Mitchell (2005) argue that in fact full employment via ELR can be accompanied by a fall in 
aggregate demand.  
  40and Keynes, this role is attributed to fiscal policy. To the extent that the NEC restores 
some role for fiscal policy, it is neither a dominant role, nor is it clear what exactly that 
role should be. It only reaffirms that fiscal policy is inherently inflationary. While the 
NEC has opened the possibility to escape false logic of government finance and to argue 
that there is nothing inherently unsustainable about government deficits, this inflationary 
impact, coupled with early supply side notions of the distortionary impact of fiscal 
policy, reasserts the need for “sound finance” as the norm. Post-Keynesians have long 
advocated fiscal policy as a policy for macro-coordination and full employment, 
suggesting that in a world of administered prices and money contracts where fundamental 
uncertainty, involuntary unemployment, and capacity underutilization are the norm, there 
is nothing inherently inflationary about fiscal policy. In fact, it can serve as an important 
stabilization tool that reestablishes the link between fiscal policy and full employments. 
Recent contributions from the Post-Keynesian camp have resurrected the Lerner’s 
functional finance approach via two distinct methods – one is an indirect approach to full 
employment via aggregate demand management and the other is a direct approach to full 
employment via a job guarantee. The next task for Post-Keynesian economists is to 
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